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JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPTION OF ART AS COMMUNICATION
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

by



PATRICIA JOAN PECOVER

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The undersigned hereby certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "John Dewey's Conception of Art as Communication and Its Implications for Education" submitted by Patricia Joan Pecover in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I discuss Dewey's statements concerning communication through art, relating them to his more general statements on the communication of experience. I attempt to show that Dewey's conception of art as communication is as important, if not more important, a part of his philosophy of art than are those aspects which receive more emphasis by him and others; and also, that the emphasis of Dewey's conception of art as communication implies a change (in emphasis at least) in the approach of the teacher of the arts.

Part A of the thesis considers first the ordinary notion of experience, then Dewey's interpretation of experience, and finally his conception of art as experience. Part B follows the same procedure with communication, but in more detail, distinguishing the roles of artist, work, and percipient and comparing them with their counterparts in ordinary communication; Part C points out general implications for education apparent in A and B.

The conclusions of the study may be summed up this way:

For Dewey art is the most important means that exists for communicating the meanings and values of our culture. Art differs from ordinary communication in that

it conveys emotional-sensory qualities (the essence of experience) rather than facts. To teach one of the arts is to teach the use of and the understanding of a language of communication. Acceptance of such a position by a teacher implies the adoption of methods, materials and goals that are consistent with this view.

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INTRODUCTION

The possibility of the occurrence of genuine communication is a broad problem. . . . It is a fact that it takes place, but the nature of community of experience is one of the most serious problems of philosophy--so serious that some thinkers deny the fact.¹

We hear [ordinary] speech but it is almost as if we were listening to a babel of tongues. Meaning and value do not come home to us. There is in such cases no communication and none of the result of community of experience that issues only when language in its full import breaks down physical isolation and external contact. Art is a more universal language than is the speech that exists in a multitude of mutually unintelligible forms.²

For some of us, to speak of art is to speak of communication. Words, sounds, colors and so on all seem tools to convey something from one person to another. However, it is quite possible for an artist or a philosopher to deny any function of communication to the work of art; it is possible to claim that to create a true work of art the artist must have no conscious intent to communicate to the percipient of his work; it is equally possible to claim that the work itself has no meaning but can hold any meaning the percipient desires to give it; and some claim that while the artist communicates nothing the percipient still receives a communication of some sort. Dewey by the very nature of his thesis cannot

ignore communication. His philosophy of art is an adaptation of his analysis of ordinary experience and one might say that the act of experiencing, to Dewey, is itself an act of communication. The environment, human or non-human, communicates its nature to the person who experiences it.

Therefore, it is necessary to explore the nature of experience briefly before considering communication itself. Part A of this paper considers the nature of ordinary experience, Dewey's interpretation of ordinary experience, and finally his interpretation of art as experience. Part B follows the same procedure with communication, but in more detail. Each section is divided into three sub-sections: the sender/artist, message/work of art, and receiver/percipient. In Part C, the points made in Parts A and B are applied to education. Thus there are two short sub-sections: one on experience and one on communication.

The use of certain terms requires explanation.

- (a) The word artist refers to painters, sculptors, authors and composers as well as musicians and actors.
- (b) Dewey distinguishes between artistic and aesthetic experience; he often uses the words interchangeably, presumably because one is often part of the other. An attempt has been made to use the correct word according to Dewey's definition, but sometimes one word must suffice

to cover both types of experience. (c) The term 'subject' presents difficulties because of the fact that it may be used in three different ways when discussing art: (1) the experience that is the cause of a work is often called its subject; e.g. "the subject that inspired that painting was the artist's wife, at the time a new mother." (2) The events or objects actually depicted in a work, as symbolized by words, colors, or sounds are also called its subject. Thus, "the subject of the painting is the Madonna and Child" (not the artist's wife). (3) The term 'subject' may also be used to describe the emotion or quality depicted: "The subject of the painting Madonna and Child is that beatific placidity of motherhood that the artist originally observed in his own wife." Dewey commonly uses subject in the second of these three ways. That use of the word has been avoided in this paper, and the word subject has been reserved for those events or objects that give inspiration to the artist. The third use of subject (which is actually a special meaning rather than ordinary usage) we have replaced by the term 'quality of experience'. (d) Explanations of the terms direct, indirect, primary and secondary experience are found on pages 9 to 11. Direct experience is used throughout the paper in preference to immediate experience and indirect instead of mediated, although Dewey uses both.

PART A: EXPERIENCE

I. Ordinary Experience

An experience is made up of three ingredients: a person, an act (experiencing) and the cause of that act. An experience does not occur if one of the three is missing. Nothing need be said here about the person who experiences except that he must be physically and mentally susceptible to experience. It is fairly clear that the cause of an experience may be anything in a person's environment, a person, a concrete object, an action or even the arrangement of such phenomena into concepts like education or dictatorship. The act of experiencing, however, requires some consideration.

The character of the act of experiencing may be determined by the way we use the word. We say, "He experienced a pain in his lower abdomen," "she experienced great anxiety when the ring disappeared," "he experienced a severe shock upon reading the telegram," or "every time she heard the tapping she experienced a tingling in her spine." Note that all these involve either sensory or emotional reaction to a cause; the latter two examples include both. Sometimes we speak of experiencing an event or a concept, as in "He experienced both world wars as a prisoner," or "The country's dictatorship for him was

experienced as simply one more handicap to his progress." Here we usually continue by elaborating on the person's feelings. "He experienced both world wars as a prisoner but throughout never lost his cheerful demeanor" or following the other example ". . . thus he was irritated but not dismayed." In ordinary usage we never experience objects. "He experienced the chair" or similar expressions may not be uncommon to philosophical discussions but are unknown in ordinary language. What we do say sometimes is "He experienced clearly the hardness of the chair in which the interrogator placed him." In other words the act of experiencing is involved with emotions or sense impressions, sometimes both in combination.

When we consider an experience rather than the act of experiencing the sensory-emotional character may seem not to apply. We say "My experience with exams has been . . ." or "His experience in Viet Nam made . . ." In these cases the experience seems to exclude emotion and sense, but note that we are not apt to say "My experience of exams has been that one receives a paper on which are printed questions. One then writes . . . etc." We usually conclude by stating a reaction like "My experience with exams is that they are to be endured" or "His experience in Viet Nam made him bitter." This is not always so however, as "My experience with exams has been that no exam is longer than three hours." But what we are talking about

in this example is part of the cause of the experience rather than the act of experiencing. When a given person encounters the situation of a paper with questions and a blank book for answers which must be completed in a given time he experiences something, but not "an exam" or "three hours." He experiences sensations or emotions.

We do not normally think of something similar to a physical act when we think of the act of experiencing nor do we think of a mental activity like reasoning. We jump a creek rather than experiencing a creek. We reason out a problem rather than experiencing a problem.* If we experience the jumping it means that we feel the effect of the act. If we experience the creek it is as a gently-flowing or dangerous phenomenon. Similar reactions to the other example can be found: we experience reasoning as stimulating or the problem as exasperating. Therefore the act of experiencing seems to be a re-acting--a sense and/or emotion response by a given person to a particular cause. The act can be repeated and still be an act of experiencing as long as the person responds sensorily or emotionally.

*If we do speak of experiencing a problem, what we mean is that the problem has caused a certain reaction, not that we have "reasoned it out" or "thought about it." In other words, we have "encountered" a problem when we experience it. This is prior to any mental action taken such as "reasoning out" or "wrestling" with the problem.

II. Dewey's Interpretation of Experience

Much of what Dewey writes on experience is an argument against various philosophic theories which try to separate the person, the act and the cause of the act.

'[Experience] recognizes no disparity between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalysed totality.'³ Also, 'When objects are isolated from the experience [person, act and objective cause] through which they are reached and in which they function, experience itself becomes reduced to the mere process of experiencing and experiencing [the act] is treated as if it were also complete in itself.'⁴

He is also well aware that experiencing implies a sensory-emotional response. In Democracy and Education he states:

The urgency, warmth and intimacy of a direct experience-- is the difference between a technical description of a picture and seeing it, or between seeing it and being moved by it; between learning mathematical equations about light and being carried away⁵ by some glorious illumination of a misty landscape.

Words such as urgency, warmth, moved, carried away, glorious, all imply an emotional response. Obviously the senses are involved as well. It is fairly well established that something which affects our senses and emotions strongly is more likely to be retained in our memory and put to use in the future. From this notion, Dewey arrives at a special meaning for experience: To experience something is to be affected by it in such a way that one's

subsequent experiences are modified. He gives the following example:

An individual may have learned that certain characteristics are conventionally esteemed in music; he may be able to converse with some correctness about classical music; he may honestly believe that these traits constitute his own musical standards. But if in his own past experience, what he has been most accustomed to and most enjoyed is ragtime, his active or working measures of valuation are fixed on the ragtime level.⁶

The (wrongly) implied inferiority of ragtime music apart, Dewey is insisting that learning a set of rules, statistics or whatever, does not constitute an experience of whatever in life those rules and statistics ('facts' if you like) stand for. Unless he has experienced classical music, his subsequent experience will not be modified. Mere knowledge does not do the trick.

Our use of the word experience in such phrases as "She underwent a trying experience last year" suggests passivity on the part of one who experiences. Dewey denies this. 'Experience,' he says, 'includes an active and a passive element peculiarly combined. . . . We do something to the thing and then it does something to us.'⁷ In some experiences it is fairly obvious that something is done by the person. He hits a ball or reads a book and that action then affects him in a particular way. But it is difficult to imagine what we do in certain other types of experience. If, for example, a gun is thrust in my ribs I experience fear. What the gun does to me is therefore apparent: the gun is the cause of my fear. But

what I do to the gun is not at all apparent. Perhaps Dewey would not count this as an experience. But it seems to fulfil the conditions, except that I do not do anything to the gun. Nevertheless a person who experiences might be said to be active if we include in his 'experience' his subsequent thoughts about what occurs. Then he "does something" to his original sensory-emotional experience. He tries to sort it out, understand it, compare what might have happened with what did happen. This in fact seems to be Dewey's interpretation. For Dewey an experience includes both an emotional-sensory reaction to something and subsequent or simultaneous reflection on this reaction. Reflection can be simultaneous to emotional-sensory reaction if one participates actively in the experience. In the case of the gun threat I will not just stand and be 'afraid. I will think of various possibilities for action and possibly take action. Even if I take no action, I will have "done something" to the situation by considering it.

The reflective part of experience Dewey calls secondary experience. Secondary experience is 'the result of continued and regulated reflective inquiry.' Primary experience on the other hand requires a minimum of reflective thinking. It is almost entirely a reaction of the senses or emotions, but always in human experience there must be some degree of reflection either simultaneously or

subsequent to the pure sense reaction. Thus my experience of fear is essentially a primary experience, although it contains a certain amount of reflective thinking. The contrast between primary and secondary experience is easily seen in Dewey's example of the observation of an eclipse (see p. 4, Experience and Nature). To merely observe an eclipse is primary experience. But to observe the eclipse, reflect on the experience, theorize and make calculations is secondary experience. Lest we think that reflection can be completely divorced from our emotional involvement in experience, Dewey has this to say:

'Reflection implies concern . . . the flagrant partisanship of human nature is evidence of the intensity of the tendency to identify ourselves with one possible course of events . . . [but] born in partiality, in order to accomplish its tasks, it must achieve a certain detached impartiality.'⁸ It is reflection that enables an experience to modify our behavior in subsequent experiences and thus changes and expands the meaning of that experience and those that follow. Without reflection, experience is mere experiencing, the searching out of one pure sensation after another without assimilation via reasoning (see p. 16, Experience and Nature).

Primary and secondary experience must be distinguished from direct and indirect experience, or what Dewey sometimes calls immediate and mediate experience. Indirect

or mediate experience is experience that is mediated. It comes to us through a medium. Any means of communication can provide such a medium.

Much of our experience is indirect . . . It is one thing to have been engaged in a war, to have shared its dangers and hardships; it is another thing to hear or read about it. All language, all symbols, are implements of an indirect experience . . . The scope of personal, vitally direct experience is very limited. . . . Every step from savagery to civilization is dependent upon the invention of media which enlarge the range of purely immediate experience and give it deepened as well as wider meaning by connecting it with⁹ things which can only be signified or symbolized.

Thus we have books, letters, pictures, tape recordings, smoke signals, movies and various sounds like drum signals, Morse code, and music, all of which mediate one person's direct experience so that another or others may share it. Many of these we classify as "art". It is through indirect experience that we establish the various values of our culture* but to count as an experience for us (and thus to affect our subsequent actions) the communication of these values must not be absorbed as mere information: data, rules or whatever. It must elicit concern, a felt response, an emotional "something".

. . . "to civilize" is defined as "to instruct in the arts of life and thus to raise the scale of civilization." Instruction in the arts of life is something other than conveying information about them. It is a matter of communication and participation¹⁰ in values of life by means of the imagination.

*Meanings are not objective but are established by a culture through communication (indirect experience) (see p. ff).

III. Art and Indirect Experience

Dewey claims that art is preferable to any other means of communicating meaning via indirect experience. He says that ' works of art are the most intimate and energetic means of aiding individuals to share in the arts of living.'¹¹ One reason is that art by its very nature is more directly concerned with sense and emotion:

. . . poet and novelist have an immense advantage over even an expert psychologist in dealing with an emotion. For the former build up a concrete situation and permit it to evoke emotional response. Instead of the description of an emotion in intellectual and symbolic terms, the artist 'does the deed that breeds the emotion.'¹²

The reader of the poem or novel presumably experiences the data about the emotion; the reader of the psychology text-book, to the extent that he is not emotionally involved, does not experience but merely stores away facts. Dewey's illustration is confusing because the subject matter of the communication (text-book or novel) is itself "emotion". But if one realizes that an artist tries to convey the sensory-emotional nature of his experience of a situation whereas a scientist or technician tries to convey the situation itself, (see p.56) any number of clearer examples can be found. An artist describes a building in such a way that it is experienced by others as grandiose, powerful, spacious, ugly and so on. A draughtsman describes its measurements and proportions. By manipulation of sounds,

colors, or objects (in literature represented by words), art enables the percipient to gain that emotional involvement necessary to experience rather than store away information.

But manipulation often implies distortion. The building that the artist depicts may be different in physical detail from the actual one. Is not a factually true account superior to an artistic account? Or is an artistically distorted description closer to being "true" because it evokes an emotion close to that evoked by the real situation experienced directly? One immediately thinks of the dangers of propaganda. If art is considered a superior means of communication of a society's values then the problem of propaganda and indoctrination must be considered. Dewey's answer to this is considered on pp. 57-58.

The other reason Dewey gives for preferring art as a means of communication seems to rest on a historical assumption:

Anything [experience?] no matter how individual in its own existence is potentially common . . . but it becomes a conscious common possession, or is shared more by art than by any other means. For it is by activities shared and by language and other means of intercourse that qualities and values become common to the experience of a group of mankind. Now art is the most effective means of communication that exists.¹³ [*Italics mine.*]

In this technological age one is inclined to ask why anything becomes a common possession more by art than

by scientific discourse. Still common sense seems to indicate that Dewey is right. It is often possible to at least partially understand certain art forms of a particular culture without knowing its written or spoken language. Also the ordinary man's values--his personal model of the world--is/are determined more by the stories he reads, the dramas he sees, the music he hears than by any statistics or data. His values are held in common with others of the same culture because of communication. Not only is art more frequently a determiner of values of a society, it seems evident that it is more effective. Our society as a whole begins to value conservation in nature, not because we have all directly felt the effects of pollution, nor because we have read statistics, but because we have been imaginatively stimulated by pictures and descriptions which emotionally involve us in the problem.

IV. The Artistic and Aesthetic Experience

First it should be made clear that when one perceives a work of art he has both an indirect and direct experience. When he looks at a picture in an art gallery, he directly experiences some sensory or emotional reaction to the colors, the frame, the other pictures nearby, the temperature of the room, the other people around him. His indirect experience however is of a quality that is conveyed to him by the picture. It is this experience

that Dewey calls aesthetic. The artist's own direct experience of that quality, which caused him to paint the picture, is also an aesthetic experience. The experience of the artist painting the picture is an artistic experience (see p.47, Art as Experience).

Though artistic and aesthetic experience obviously differ from each other in the nature of the activity involved, Dewey concentrates on their similarities. Both are essentially similar to ordinary experience but differ in one highly important respect. This is the attitude of the one who is experiencing, whether it be the artist or the percipient. Dewey speaks of the 'delight of the housewife in tending her plants' and of the 'zest of the spectator in poking the wood burning on the hearth' and quotes Coleridge on 'the pleasurable activity of the journey itself' rather than 'a restless desire to arrive at the final solution.'¹⁴ In other words, if an experience is appreciated for itself without any consideration of the consequences, that experience is aesthetic rather than ordinary. The housewife concerned with whether her plants will produce enough vegetables to can or freeze, the man poking the fire in order to make it burn faster, are experiencing, but not aesthetically.

Dewey claims that in artistic or aesthetic experience, just as in ordinary experience, the sensory-emotional cannot be divorced from the reflective, although

this seems to be more true of the artist than of the percipient. It seems on the surface quite possible that a percipient could truly experience a work of art in Dewey's own sense--with concern, and for itself--without ever going beyond sense impressions. Dewey speaks of experiencing 'the sumptuousness of fabrics, [and] matured richness of fruits.'¹⁵ What reasoning, what meaning could possibly characterize the enjoyment of fabric or fruit for itself without destroying the artistic nature of the experience? Certainly not speculation as to the climate, soil or number of hours of sunlight required to perfect the ripe fruit; then equally not the dye or type or warp and woof of the fabric. Presumably though, what Dewey has in mind is the relating of this one experience to other previous ones. If consciously done, this is certainly a reflective act.

The artist however can never ignore ideas and reasoning:--an idea* may give rise to his artistic creation (as with Shostakovitch's Leningrad Symphony, which is based on the siege of Leningrad); or a primary experience of his own may be reflected on and turned into a work of art (for example a day in the country--as in Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony)--after all the artist must consciously think about these things before creating his painting or music or whatever; and the realization of the work, be it

*The intellectual interpretation of an event or situation.

a clay vase or a three-act play, demands reasoning in the form of application of technique. (Such problems as which details are to be emphasized in order to create the desired effect, and how to succeed in doing so are problems of technique.) Certainly for the artist then, there is a necessary relation of reasoning and emotion or pure sense reaction. That both these qualities are also incorporated in the work of art itself seems a fair statement.

To summarize: Dewey believes cultural characteristics and values are for the most part communicated indirectly, and that this is best done through art. Although artistic or aesthetic experience includes any experience undertaken for itself rather than for a practical reason, it is only by artists through works of art that experience is deliberately encouraged as an end in itself. In order to more fully understand the type of experience that produces or is occasioned by art we must study it in its role as a particularly effective means of communicating the meanings and values of a given culture. Thus we now turn to a discussion of communication, followed by a longer analysis of the specific role of art in communication.

PART B: COMMUNICATION

The distinction between aesthetic [appreciating] and artistic [creating] cannot be pressed so far as to become a separation. Perfection in execution cannot be measured or defined in terms of execution; it implies those who perceive and enjoy the product that is executed. The cook prepares food for the consumer and the measure of the value of what is prepared is found in consumption.¹⁶

The work of art is complete only as it works in the experience of others than those who created it . . . There is the speaker, the thing said, and the one spoken to. The external object, the product of art, is the connecting link between artist and audience.¹⁷

In the two passages quoted here, Dewey makes it clear that he wishes to consider the artist, the work of art and the audience together, in what he calls a "triadic relationship". Since this seems on the surface indistinguishable from the relationship between any sender of a communication, the message itself, and its receiver, let us first consider the role each of the three (sender, message, and receiver) play in the most ordinary sense of communication. We should then be in a position to compare these with Dewey's views on communication before turning to communication through art.

I. Ordinary Communication

(a) The Word "communication"

The word communication denotes nothing more than the transmitting of information, usually a series of facts but sometimes emotions, from one person to another. We imply in using the word that the message can be understood even though it may not be. We make such statements as (1) the bride and groom communicated for five years by mail before they actually met; (2) the hostages were not allowed to communicate with their relatives; (3) a communication has just been received from our Ottawa bureau; or (4) because of the "generation gap", the parents could not communicate with their children. It is apparent that sometimes "communicate" is a euphemism for "talk to" or "send a message to"; but it is equally true that it connotes slightly more than this: it sometimes suggests that the message is of more importance than one merely "sent", as in example 3; it can suggest a kind of personal intimacy as in examples 1, 4 and possibly 2, that does not exist in all communication, say the sending of a business telegram from one company to another. This felt closeness between communicants* in some uses of the word

*Communicant is the term given not only to someone who communicates but also someone who participates in communion. This emphasizes the nearness in meaning of some uses of communication to communion.

may serve to cloud the issue. It will be well to be aware of the strong sense of sharing sometimes implied by the word communicate. However, since this is not always the case, let us in considering the various roles of sender, message, and receiver, try to use "communicate" in a strictly denotative sense, its dictionary meaning, while retaining its ordinary, non-technical usage: '1. pass along, transfer. 2. give (information) by talking, writing, etc.'¹⁸ A letter, telegram, semaphore message, drum or smoke signal are all communications in this sense.

(b) The Sender

Four qualities seem necessary to the person who sends a message. First, he must have something to say, the subject matter of the message. This may be an event or scene which the sender describes, such as from a forestry department look-out tower, "smoke sighted approximately one mile south of tower east of highway"; or it may be a list of measurements, quantities and/or objects such as a stock market report. Often both types of information occur within a message.

Second, there must be a felt need to communicate the subject matter and a conscious intent to do so. This need may be dictated by the subject matter as in a warning or a call for help; it may also be a psychological need such as loneliness or sense of duty or desire to please.

But no one communicates by letter, telegram or smoke signal just because he wants to try out his penmanship, Morse code, or fire-building ability. To exercise these skills he need not send a message. If the communicator has no conscious intention of sending a message, it is still possible for someone to receive a communication from him, but such communication is accidental. The one responsible cannot be considered a participant in communication (see p. 33). He has betrayed information rather than communicated it. The husband who comes home with a blond hair on his shoulder has certainly communicated something to his wife, but accidentally.

The third quality that must be possessed by the sender of a communication is skill in handling his medium of communication, whether it be semaphore, I.B.M. abbreviations, Morse code or words. This includes knowing what to say and how to say it. That is, if a fire-spotter is reporting smoke in the forest he must know what details to include and what to leave out (he must give enough information to pin-point the location in as clear a manner as possible without including so much detail he confuses or wastes the time of the receiver of the communication). Beyond this he must know how to use the medium so that he says what he intends. A misplaced flag, a misspelled word, an incorrect combination of dots and dashes could lead to unintelligibility or even worse, a message conveying the opposite meaning to what is intended. The

emphasis is on clarity, on accuracy. Whatever skill is used by the sender, he uses it in order that the recipient receives exactly what he sent. Art does not lend itself to precision of communication in this sense. Many interpretations of a single work exist, and the meaning of a work for its audience varies with time. (But such differences are often only in emphasis.) Is the role of the artist different from that of the ordinary communicator or is the nature of the message itself different?

The fourth point is almost self-explanatory. Like the passage of electricity which requires a positive pole, a medium and a negative pole, the passage of ordinary information requires besides the sender, both a medium and a receiver. The semaphore signaller needs a clear sky and flags; the letter writer requires paper, pen, language and the postal system; the tribal drummer must have drum, mallet, and favorable air currents; without these no message can be sent. And unless someone sees the flags, reads the letter, or hears the drums no communication has taken place. The sender, therefore, requires a medium in which he is skilled, and a receiver who can understand his message.

These four conditions seem necessary to any sender of a message. To be a good communicator, at least three other attributes are required. First, the sender of a message must correctly understand what he sees, hears or experiences (that which causes him to send a communication).

The fire spotter must know smoke from steam; a relative sending a telegram about illness in the family must correctly understand the doctor's assessment of the illness; a broker, clerk or agent communicating stock trends must correctly interpret the stock market--rising or falling? steadily? by how much?; the writer of the friendly letter must know gossip from fact.

The communicator must also be able to draw certain implications from his subject matter which enable him to decide not only whether to send a message but what kind to send. His general knowledge of associated matters will come into play. Some judgments depend on his assessment of the receiver; some depend on what is considered good taste; some depend on what reaction is required; usually all these come into play. For example, the bearer of bad tidings should be able to state them strongly enough that the recipient will realize their magnitude, yet he must know what is likely to sound crude or offensive to that person. Such an ability in the sender will improve the quality of his communication. Has a degree of art been added to skill?

If skill is necessary for communication, how far can increased technical skill improve the quality of communication? It might seem that virtuosity should mark the superior communicator. However this is true only in so far as it affects intelligibility of the particular message to the receiver of the message. It is not

necessary for a fire-spotter to have an extensive vocabulary; it would be ridiculous for the semaphore signaller to signal so fast that no one could decipher what he says. Only sufficient technical skill to accurately convey the message is necessary for a good communication. This along with an ability to correctly perceive his subject matter and assess its implications distinguishes a "good" communicator.

(c) The Message

However one may interpret Marshall McLuhan, it is necessary in ordinary usage to distinguish the medium from the message. The medium in ordinary communication is the vehicle used to communicate. Like any vehicle, it must carry something and is related to communication only when it is used to carry information from one person to another. Telephone, T.V., pen and paper, and telegraphy equipment are all vehicles of communication. Perhaps as McLuhan seems to be saying the nature of the vehicle of communication determines to a certain extent the tone of the message transmitted and how it is received; that is to say the emotional trappings of a given subject are affected by the medium through which it is transmitted.

But the message is clearly not the medium. The message is a body of information selected and arranged by the sender from a given subject for transmission through the medium. Sometimes the information is directly

transmitted from the subject matter: words are sent as words, numbers as numbers and so on, and no attempt is made to alter, select or arrange them. A telephone call reporting results of a horse race just as they appeared on the list at the track would fall into this category. Usually, though, some selection and arrangement* occurs, e.g., a list of only the winners may be communicated, and often the message is translated into symbols: an observed event is translated into words; or words are changed into arrangements of colors as in ships' flag signals; or sounds of various lengths are arranged to represent words or ideas as in Morse code or drum signalling. These symbols are then re-translated by the receiver of the message. The symbols should when re-translated give a concept of the original data that is fairly accurate.

It is to be noted that the symbols are not admired for themselves as colors, sounds or forms. The strip of words on a telegram is not admired for itself, nor is the rhythmic click of dots and dashes or the brilliant colors of flags against a dark sea or grey sky. This is important when we return to Dewey and art as a means of communicating.

*This has some relevance to art in that there continues to be a somewhat old-fashioned but still revived argument about such things as whether a painting of a lake strives to come as close as possible to a real lake and whether the real lake is therefore "better" than the painting, and the opposite: whether viewing a real lake is an aesthetic experience as the lake is not art. As Dewey touches on these things, they are worth comparing with ordinary communication.

For adequate communication, the medium should be suitable to the message. A long detailed description is better done by letter than by telegram. The message itself must have the potential of being understood by the receiver in the way that the sender intended. Degrees of accuracy are possible: in some cases, for communication to succeed, it is only necessary that the message enable its receiver to get a general idea of the actual situation. In other cases, he must receive a completely accurate description. However, to be a good message, the sender's intent should be what is communicated to the receiver: if the sender intends him to get only a sketchy idea, he will; if the sender intends him to receive a clear account, he will not--if he is himself capable of interpreting the message--end up with a hazy concept. Because of this, one is tempted to say that in normal communication the message has a moral function of transmitting truth. This is not anything built into the concept of a message, however; if the sender's intent is to deceive, then a good message will more likely deceive the receiver than a poor one. A superior or good message then is one which is capable of affecting the receiver as the sender intended.

(d) The Receiver

Compared to the sender of the message, the receiver's role is relatively passive. The sender sees or

hears (less usually smells, tastes or touches) something, interprets what his senses have told him with a view to communicating the information, then uses his skill to create a message. The latter act requires an understanding of the symbols used in the medium--color, sound, words or other forms, as well as an ability both to create those symbols and to arrange them to make a desired effect. On the other hand, the receiver of the message must possess only the ability to understand the symbols; i.e., he may be able to read but not write, or be able to read and write but not write well enough to send a message of the complexity he can understand as receiver. Given an understanding of the symbols, all he must do as receiver is interpret that particular message. If he is limited in his ability or skill, he may only partially understand, or he may misunderstand completely.

But no matter how thorough or scant his understanding, the receiver must react in some way if he realizes what he has perceived is a communication. This reaction may be emotional--as to good or bad news; it may involve action--as when the message is that his house is on fire; or he may react by deliberately ignoring the message. Given only the knowledge that what he is seeing or hearing is a communication, he is compelled to react in some way even if it is by trying to understand what the message is. This would seem to be due to the receiver's recognition that communication in the ordinary sense

implies a need by the sender for communicating, either an external need (if I am not told my house is on fire, various unpleasant results may occur) or an internal one (a lonely person, a happy person feels a need to share his state of mind or even just share what he can of others' company in spite of distance). Even the recipient of a communication consisting of a list of stock prices has done more than merely receive data. To a man involved in the market such a list indicates buying or selling, profit or loss, and the appropriate action or emotion involved. Even for the runner who posts the lists without understanding any more than the fact that it is a list to be posted, understanding of the communication rests in what is required of him as a reaction. He acts if he receives the communication. He ignores it at the risk of losing his job.

If a person inadvertantly (as opposed to deliberately) ignores a communication, it is because he does not realize that what he has perceived is a communication and not just a phenomenon. A search party who ignores a trail blazed on trees does so because they do not recognize that the marks they see are a communication from the sought person indicating the direction he has taken. Reading (or hearing) a simple communication with any level of comprehension entails a reaction to the communication. This reaction is certainly similar to if not identical with

Dewey's experience (even the deliberate ignoring of a message) in that it is to some degree sensory, emotional and intellectual in character and affects subsequent behavior. With increased skill in comprehension the reaction becomes more complex. With increased involvement of the recipient, the reaction is more intense.

II. Dewey's Views on Communication

Discourse itself is both instrumental and consummatory. Communication is an exchange which procures something wanted; it involves a claim, appeal, order, direction or request . . . it procures the cooperative assistance of others. Communication is also an immediate enhancement of life, enjoyed for its own sake.¹⁹

The foregoing quotation is typical of Dewey's approach to communication. It shows itself most clearly in the chapter "Nature, Communication and Meaning" in Experience and Nature. Most important is his claim that communication is co-operative or sharing in nature. Second is his approach to communication as being at once 'uniquely instrumental and uniquely final',²⁰ i.e. it is a means to achieving any number of desired things such as knowledge, understanding, friendship and various objects but it is also enjoyable in itself. Thirdly, Dewey prefers to treat communication in general rather than considering the separate roles of sender and receiver. Therefore, instead of stressing the differences between the two, he emphasizes their similarities.

Nevertheless, Dewey does not deny what he calls

the "triadic" conditions necessary for communication already quoted from Art as Experience on p. 18 (speaker, hearer and subject). He adds to these (not inconsistently) as a condition for communication, the existence of an organized group to which both speaker and hearer belong. This group is presumably a large group sharing the same culture and language but could also be a sub-group which shares certain common traditions such as participation in religious ceremonies, family chamber music, or regular visits to art galleries. Although such groups do not represent the whole population of a given culture, they can communicate well in the areas shared by their group, whereas members of the larger cultural group who do not share the sub-culture could not communicate as well. In any group, then, that shares values, meanings and language 'engaging in rites and ceremonies hallowed by time and rich with the sense of the countless multitudes that share in them . . . In them discourse is both instrumental and final. [Individuals in such a group not only enjoy the activity for itself but] No person remains unchanged and has the same future efficienc[ies] who shares in situations made possible by communication.'²¹ This is not to say that sharing traditions necessarily means communicating, only that such a shared cultural background is necessary before communication can take place. Otherwise the communicants cannot understand each other.

Dewey's examples in "Nature, Communication, and Meaning" are often taken from art, presumably because art is an activity obviously enjoyed for itself and other experiences become aesthetic when this is the case (see p. 15). But Dewey intends us to include all activities of communication as being instrumental and final and, most important, of a sharing nature; for his emphasis throughout the chapter is on sharing: the sharing of life's experiences enhances life itself.

Now sharing is surely not uppermost in our minds when we think of ordinary communication. Yet sharing can be a very strong characteristic of communication, as we have already seen (p. 19). In certain cases we choose the word communicate in preference to another word or phrase such as talk or give--as in "That teacher can communicate (not talk) with the younger generation," or "He cannot communicate (not give) information to his pupils adequately"--for the very reason that we wish to suggest the quality of sharing. But Dewey wants more than this. Even so simple a message as a request of a flower by A from B entails a sharing of experience. When A points to the flower B does not react just to the pointing but 'perceives the thing as it may function in A's experience . . . Similarly A sees the thing . . . as a thing capable of being grasped by B'.²² If sharing is a characteristic of A's request of a flower from B, then it can be equally

a characteristic of any of the examples considered in PART B: I. The teletype operator sending his message experiences it as something to be comprehended by the operator who receives it and vice versa, thereby increasing the breadth of understanding of each. However, if the sender of such a message does indeed in a sense imagine the receiver's way of perceiving his subject and thus modifies his own concept--and this does not seem altogether certain, then such sharing is surely trivial. It matters very little to the success of the communication whether or how thoroughly B shares A's attitude to the flower. The communication is successful when B understands what A intends. He need not modify his understanding of the flower.

Looked at from a different perspective however, the sharing nature of communication assumes a much greater importance. Dewey sees it historically as the cause of meaning, of language and ultimately of the emergence of mind. It is such a view that enables him to argue convincingly against language (of any sort--colors, sounds, or mathematical symbols as well as words) being merely a means of "expression". In this context even A, B and the flower become important.

Dewey's argument is based on his contention that for any individual there is no absolute meaning for a particular phenomenon in the world. There is only the meaning that exists through two or more people having

shared the experience of that phenomenon and the communication of it by means of which a sensory experience becomes analysable, a subject of contemplation and thus understandable (see quote 28, p. 34). He reasons as follows: 'Cries and gestures [often thought of as "expression"] are organic behavior as much as are locomotion, seizing, and crunching.'²³ The agent (e.g., a baby crying) has no intent; his cry is 'an organic overflow' and 'communication of meaning exists for the observer, not for the agent'.²⁴ However, once the baby uses the cry deliberately to attain certain results and the mother attaches a particular meaning to the cry, the two share in the meaning of that "language". Similarly with A, B and the flower: A's gesture communicates to B that he should bring the flower to A. Such a gesture has meaning to both A and B because that meaning has been previously established by past experience. Thus, no word, no symbol is arbitrarily attached to an event or object. Meaning and language both result from communication. 'The heart of language is not "expression" of something antecedent . . . It is communication: the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership.'²⁵

The mistake of the ancients, Dewey feels, was that they 'took a work of social art to be nature independent of man. They overlooked the fact that the import of

logical and rational essences is the consequence of social interactions',²⁶ --and, it will be recalled, for us there is no "truth" but that which we are capable of communicating to each other. In communication 'qualitative immediacies cease to be dumbly rapturous . . . They become capable of survey, contemplation, and ideal or logical elaboration; when something can be said of qualities they are purveyors of instruction. Learning and teaching come into being.'²⁷

The ancients' belief that they were communicating (through their art) the truth of nature, has been replaced by the modern discovery of so-called "inner" experience and its resulting emphasis on purely personal events, that 'egotistical strain in modern thought' as Dewey calls it. He thinks that this opposite side of the coin is equally mistaken in its 'failure to recognize that this world of inner experience is dependent on an extension of language, which is itself a social product.'²⁸ E.A. Kirkpatrick in Imagination and Its Place in Education is emphatic that even creative imagination (as opposed to memory or reconstructive imagination) is based on prior stimulation from the existing world as experienced by a given person. (Persons blind from birth imagine sounds and tactile sensations rather than pictures, and the most fantastic space fiction monstrosities are based on known phenomena.) But we have seen that the meaning of our past experience

comes through communication; not only this, but much of our experience of the world is indirect, i.e., communicated to us in words or pictures by another (see p. 11). Thus, our inner private experience is based on the existing or public world--the world which we share with others, the meaning of which we gain either directly through social experience or indirectly through art. Both involve sharing; both are communication. Therefore in art, not only is communication an effect of the work, but the ultimate cause of the work whether the artist bases his work on something highly personal or attempts to re-create 'reality'; for as it is through communication that ideas and meanings come to be, the artist's ideas (whether based on inner experience or nature) could not exist without prior communication.

Such a point of view is close to a Marxist position; but presumably whereas a Marxist would argue that so-called inner experience is only secondarily personal, individual, or unique at all, and primarily a product of the society in which the artist exists, Dewey would go along with Kirkpatrick and the existentialists, both of whom strongly emphasize the role of habit and mood in making one individual's experience of a situation differ from another's. Thus the personal quality of a work of art is as important as its social origin. It communicates one arrangement of events and objects of the social world

colored by one person's mood or life pattern or habit. The personal meaning of those public objects and events is thereby changed, broadened or modified for the percipient. After all, 'Human beings illustrate the same traits of both immediate uniqueness and connection, relationship as do other things.'²⁹

Although such discussion may seem to stray from communication in general to artistic communication, Dewey intends his examples from art to serve for general conclusions. In the foregoing paragraphs it should be clear that he is simply using art to show that our notions of both nature and mind are products of communication rather than the other way round. We may summarize this way: without shared direct experience there is no meaning; without meaning there is no communication; without communication there is no indirect experience; without indirect experience meaning can neither deepen nor broaden nor change.

It is true that Dewey wants his notion of communication to fit the most simple (A, B and flower) type, yet most of what he has to say about communication is based on a kind of communication more closely resembling art. He says, for example, 'through speech, a person dramatically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many roles*, not in successive stages of life but in a

*There is no reason to think that in this passage

contemporaneously acted drama. Thus mind emerges.³⁰

Although speech is specifically referred to, we may assume he would include any other method of communication such as gesture, diagrams, signs or the written word, provided they convey the sort of message that lends itself to the acting in imagination of a role not yet experienced in real life. Although role-playing may characterize a speaker as well as a listener, the speaker does not 'play roles' in the same way a listener does, even though he may indeed try to look at his subject the way someone listening to his story might. Also, such role playing by the hearer seems far more likely and more rewarding in the sort of communication that approaches story-telling than in the A, B and flower type. These two points are made clearer by comparing the situation of A, B and the flower with one more closely resembling the art form of the story, i.e. someone telling of an experience: in the A, B and flower example, B as hearer or receiver of the communication can imagine A's attitude to the flower in requesting it; equally A may in imagination experience B's role as flower picker. Contrast this with a less simple communication, one which approaches the art form of the story: X is telling Y of his recent first-time appearance in court as a witness. He has been frustrated and

Dewey is referring to a person acting or talking the way he believes a person of a certain class or trade should act or talk. He is referring instead to the ability of a person to imagine himself in various situations.

confused. Y will imagine himself in X's role and his understanding of the situation is increased. He may also better understand X himself from X's revealed attitude to the incident, and by imagining how he himself would react, possibly gains a certain self-revelation. X, however, will probably look at the situation slightly differently as he sees it from Y's point of view (he may now laugh as he realizes how his confusion will be pictured by Y).* He may also learn something of Y from Y's reaction (but in this sense Y is the communicator, not X, see p. 47) and something of himself from thinking about the situation with a view to telling someone about it. Even considering all the possibilities of enlightenment for X and Y, it seems fairly clear that Y's understanding (if he understands the message and not just X's state of mind) is far more changed than X's, whereas A and B equally increase their understanding by appreciating the role of the other. Y now has in imagination experienced an appearance in court (an indirect experience); his knowledge of human behavior is deepened when he hears of X's confusion and perceives his subsequent laughter. X however may receive very little enlightenment from the communication itself, although he may learn much from the direct experience in

* 'Try the experience of communicating with fullness and accuracy, some experience to another . . . and you will find your own attitude toward your experience changing.'³¹

court and his subsequent contemplation of the experience. If he fails to imagine Y's attitude as a listener, he will do little more than reconstruct what happened--even then his memory may be faulty. Y seems to learn more in quantity and the nature of what he learns is different. His learning emphasizes what has previously been outside his own experience; any understanding that X gains is mainly an elaboration or clarification of something he has already experienced.

It would seem then that modes of communication more closely resembling art such as the "story" of the court appearance, place the sender and receiver of the communication in very different positions regarding 'the emergence of mind'. The quotation on page 34 indicates that through communication 'learning and teaching come into being' but the roles of sender and receiver are not equal: the sender teaches; the receiver learns. Only in the same sense that we say a teacher learns from his pupils, does the sender of a communication learn. Let us now consider these roles separately.

(a) The Sender

The ordinary notion of a communication (p. 19 to p. 29) is in general not inconsistent with Dewey's, although the same cannot be said of his views on the artist as communicator. However, one or two points may be made.

Normally we consider the communicator's attitude

to a subject important; i.e., there must be some object, event, or idea that is sufficiently important to the sender that he feels a need to inform someone else of it. But for Dewey, the subject matter seems to be relatively unimportant; it is the experience of communication itself that counts. The importance of the sender is not so much in his function as the imparter of news but as (1) the recipient of new understanding (see bottom of page 38) and (2) sharer in a communion of human spirits. Thus A's significance in a conversation between A and B lies not in his subject (what A is telling B) nor his skill (how well he does it) but in his own position as a learner (what he learns of himself, his subject and B from talking--the instrumental nature of communication) and as a sharer (in the pleasure of B's company--the consummatory, final nature of communication). It is not so much what the sender does for someone else as what he himself gains. As previously discussed, what he himself gains can be very little compared to what he gives, but for Dewey this does not matter. Thus the value of a communication could be measured by how much the sender gains in understanding and his enjoyment of the act rather than the skill with which he conveys the subject matter, or even his choice of subject where this applies.

That sharing in itself is important and desirable is not an unusual point of view. Ernst Fischer in The

Necessity of Art talks of mankind's longings for his 'lost unity'. Herbert Read's main theme concerns man's alienation from his fellows due to suppression of his 'collective unconscious' (like Fischer's concept, an instinctive desire to be part of a whole. The term is borrowed from Jung and Freud.) S.M. Robertson in Rosegarden and Labyrinth holds a similar view to Read's. She relates the experience of a group of art students, who, after a particularly disturbing visit through a coal mine, would have been quite unable to paint their experience, had they not first spontaneously acted it out as a group, in so doing releasing a tension that would have hindered them as individuals from completing the painting. In ordinary experience a similar phenomenon is found in the habit of many people who, after writing an examination, making a speech, playing a concert or any other intense experience, gather with a group of friends--usually others who have participated in the experience. While such a gathering is neither part of nor prior to an act of communication such as the mime after the coal mine experience, it suggests that sharing others' company (regardless of what is shared) is a human need and itself a type of communication. Such events as mass political rallies or religious gatherings seem to depend for their effect on a felt unity among the large number of people gathered. Witness as well the mass of humanity gathered at the recent Woodstock rock festival. It seems fairly

obvious that communication was taking place; in fact many participants would say that they travelled across the country to attend in order to experience communication. Yet for how many was the subject matter of the songs, or even of their own conversations important? No, it seems more likely that what was communicated was a yet nameless emotion (for emotional tone is certainly characteristic of all these examples)--a sharing not dependent on any particular subject matter. It is this kind of sharing that Dewey emphasizes in communication, although he does not consider it as a specifically emotional thing.

Of course the sharing aspect of communication is its "final" aspect--its "for itself" justification, and Dewey certainly does not wish its "instrumental" role to be slighted. As has been pointed out already, he stresses the acquisition of meaning, of understanding through communication. The sender of the communication wishes to accomplish something in which a receiver plays a part. Meaning is gained through his action and that of the receiver. 'Primarily meaning is intent . . . A proposes the consummatory possession of the flower through the medium or means of B's action'.³² The sender's intent gives meaning to an event or object. The intent of A to possess the flower adds meaning to the flower. It becomes an object desired by A, not just an object with stem, leaves, etc. It is A's message that gives it this meaning.

(b) The Message

We have seen (pp. 24 to 26) that the ordinary message of communication is a selection and arrangement of information for the intended purpose of communicating some idea from one person to another. It is a successful message if the selection and arrangement enables the intent of the sender to be realized. In order to be a message, and not just a phenomenon, it must be sent to a potential receiver. It must have the potentiality of being understood. Therefore, Dewey says (see p. 30), sufficient cultural conditions must be held in common by sender and receiver. The sender's symbols (words, code, etc.) which represent his ideas, must be understood by the receiver, and as well there must be a more subtle understanding based on the accumulated meanings the symbols have achieved for each through their shared experience.

The development of meaning through shared experience may seem at first to apply only to very personal communication (such as when the mention of a certain word stirs two companions to laughter because of an experience they both have shared, though the word has no particular significance for anyone else in the room), or to very vague gradual developments through history (such as the reason the word museum has come to be associated more with a building housing ancient artifacts than with a home of the muses). But Dewey's point is not about special cases

or exceedingly general cases. In order for any ordinary message to succeed as communication, the sender and receiver must share enough culturally that the symbols used not only have meaning but similar meaning for each. If a British father cables relatives overseas that "John married nice homely girl" it is important that they all understand homely to mean home-loving and comfortable rather than ugly and unattractive. Similarly the message "John married nice Catholic girl" could be intended to convey satisfaction and relief that the groom has done what is considered to be the right thing, or mingled disappointment, worry, and hope because although the girl's faith is a problem she is still "nice". Understanding of the message depends on the receiver and sender, prior to communication, at least being knowledgable of each other's viewpoint if not agreeing with it.

Thus, the message, for Dewey, is based on prior meanings and is itself a contribution to a new meaning for the object, event or idea it presents.* This means that a message cannot convey "the truth" about a matter. What it conveys is a point of view. In the case of anything but the most rudimentary communication (such as A, B and the flower) the new meaning achieved seems to depend very

*since in communication both the sender and receiver are enabled to perceive the subject from a new point of view, thus gaining in understanding.

strongly on the selection and arrangement of details. One man telling of his experience in court may pick out details of a humorous nature; another may emphasize the procedure; still another may concentrate on his interpretations of the behavior of one person--the judge, or a lawyer. Each description casts a different light on the subject; each illuminates a different facet of understanding of the situation. The same might be said of a pictured account. Each communicated experience, like each direct experience, leads to more complete understanding. It is quite probable that Dewey would subscribe to this description of communication by Lawren Harris of the Group of Seven, which coincides also with his own view of learning through experience:³³

Creatively one can only move from and through the particular to the universal. Thus, if I paint a house, say in a back street in Hamilton, I assume the shape of that particular house, experience its form, its meaning, its relationship to the soil it rises from, the skies that bathe it in reflection of their colors and mood . . .; and the more direct my experience of that is, the more I permit that house to dictate to me how I shall paint it. . . . The picture of the house is then bound to bring to life in the spectator, myself firstly, the experience of all life in decrepit houses.*

*It is interesting that Lawren Harris considers his gradual development toward an abstract style an indication of his growing understanding of universals through their particular individual manifestations. Dewey has much the same thing to say about abstractions such as mathematical symbols. They are liberating because by getting away from the particular, the general is made clearer. This, he says, 'opens the way to new uses and consequences' (p. 192, Experience and Nature). Would he say the same of abstract painting and music?

The Receiver

It almost goes without saying that Dewey does not see the role of receiver of a communication as passive. The receiver is a sharer and a learner; both of these require active participation. If the receiver does not participate, he does not experience and therefore no communication takes place. But it seems quite possible to admit this, and still view the receiver of a communication quite differently from the sender. Surely one is less active in some ways than the other.

On the one hand, sharing assumes a different nature for each (see pp. 37-39). In the role of sender, one person conveys to another a body of information of some sort. Usually this information is external to him (of an object or event) but may sometimes consist of or include information about himself (his state of mind, opinions, personality). He could be said to share his knowledge with another. By this we mean that he gives of what knowledge or insight he possesses to another. However, the receiver of a communication does not experience any of the giving that is characteristic of the act of sharing.* If the communication is between two persons in the same room, then the receiver may react bodily or

*Whereas I might say as giver "I am sharing my lunch with John", I am unlikely to say as receiver, "I am sharing John's lunch". More likely I will say "John is sharing his lunch with me". However if we each give to the other we may say "John and I are sharing our lunches".

verbally to the sender's viewpoint, modifying or reinforcing the sender's feelings with his own reaction; he then may be said to share with the sender certain views or feelings. But in reacting he conveys information through words or facial expression; then he becomes the sender of a communication. Therefore sharing may be said to occur in communication by virtue of the ability of sender and receiver to reverse roles.

In certain types of communication this is a likely situation. Any social communication such as the exchange of friendly letters lends itself to sharing; or a concert where the applause or spellbound silence makes itself felt to the performer. Yet even in the latter example, there is a heavier weighting of giving on the part of the performer, and receiving on the part of the listener. Other types of communication do not at all lend themselves to sharing: business communication or any message sent over a distance where a reply is not called for nor the receiver's reaction perceived by the sender, are of this type. In the exchange of business correspondence, the two parties might be said to share in the information exchanged, but if it is completely impersonal, this does not seem to be Dewey's idea of sharing (see p. 42). When a single message is sent from one person to another, the receiver has no opportunity to assume the role of sender and thus share anything with him. Such is also the case

with books, records, pictures and movies as opposed to plays and concerts. The receiver of such communication remains a receiver. Although he must be active in order to experience (not just an empty vessel into which information is poured--see pp. 8-9) the receiver qua receiver does not give, he accepts; his role is certainly less active than the sender's in sharing (the final aspect of communication), if he may be said to share at all.

On the other hand, where learning (the instrumental aspect of communication) is concerned the receiver's role is the more active one. The sender of a communication may in so doing clarify his own ideas; the receiver is likely to do this and more, for he gains new information as well, and anything he knew before achieves new significance. 'A newly acquired meaning is forced upon everything that does not obviously resist its application, as a child uses a new word whenever he gets the chance.'³⁴ The flower for B becomes not just a flower but something which may be given to A, something that A wants. For A, the sender, on the other hand, the flower is already something he wants before he communicates with B. For him, in communication, only one aspect is added to the meaning of the flower: that it may be carried by B. Dewey does not want to admit that the potentiality of meaning for the flower is any greater for B than for A, but it seems fairly obvious that this is so in much communication.

If learning is viewed as action, then certainly

the receiver is more active as a learner than the sender; but if learning is compared with teaching and the sender of any communication is viewed as a teacher in the sense that he deliberately attempts to convey information to the receiver, then the receiver's role (as learner) is still less active than the sender's. He simply does less.

The sender attempts to understand a situation. Then he selects, arranges, changes thoughts to symbols using skill and judgment in all these. The receiver re-translates attempts to understand and connect what he has learned with the rest of his experience. That is all. The difficulty of making the learner active when he is so obviously on the receiving end of communication may be justification enough for the activity method in teaching* (see p. 91).

It should be true, if Dewey's analysis of communication is sound, that the receiver of a communication as well as the sender should enjoy the activity of communication as an end in itself, not just as a means to learning. This hardly seems true of ordinary communication except in those cases where sharing for the sake of sharing ("togetherness") is possible and the subject of the communication less important. It may be, however, that for Dewey even A's request of a flower from B (or the head

*In an actual teacher-pupil situation, the teacher whose methods are based on a "let's see what we can discover today about farming in South America" approach seems to be closer to Dewey than the one who begins "This summer I visited South America and I'd like to share with you what I learned".

office's request of a file from its branch office?) is evidence of man's social nature and therefore is in some way fulfilling for both parties. Or is it the learning itself that can be rewarding, not just as a means to accomplish some further practical end, but as a deepening of the receiver's understanding of the world thus making learning the final as well as instrumental nature of communication rather than a more nebulous enjoyment of the act of sharing. It would be hard to pin Dewey down. One statement, though, lends itself to uniting both interpretations:³⁵

Communication is uniquely instrumental and uniquely final. It is instrumental in liberating us from the otherwise overwhelming pressure of events and enabling us to live in a world of things that have meaning. It is final as a sharing in the objects and arts precious to a community, a sharing whereby meanings are enhanced, deepened and solidified in the sense of communion.

Although understanding is viewed here as instrumental, and sharing final, the sharing he speaks of is itself a kind of understanding. Put a different way, what Dewey sees is not just a two-in-one (instrumental-final) nature for communication, but a cyclical process: by communication, meaning is achieved; through mutual understanding of meanings, further communication is possible; this leads to expanded, deepened meanings. Gradually generalizations are made; principles are formed. Put this way, it seems obvious that communication's final nature is simply the greatest possible understanding.

Sharing now assumes a wider meaning. The receiver of any communication, no matter how trivial or how impersonal, shares more fully in his culture, (1) because he is learning and (2) his learning is deepened by his sense of communion (sharing).

There is one point still not cleared up. If we grant that a communication from head office P to branch office Q somehow enables the recipient in office Q to share more fully in his culture, what of the person who receives the same or similar message again and again? Does his understanding increase each time, or is he unaffected by all but the initial message? It would seem that repeated communications affect the receiver's understanding only under these conditions: (1) that his own situation has altered between the two messages thus modifying his reaction; (2) that he did not fully understand the first message but for some reason (a change in his skill, a slight change in the message itself) he now understands better than before; (3) the effect of repetition in a given situation intensifies his reaction rather than dulls it (the first of a series of calls for help may merely shock or puzzle; each subsequent call may intensify the listener's realization of a desperate situation).

If such conditions are present, then the receiver of a communication is increasing his understanding and thus sharing more fully in his culture than before. This

is as true in art as in ordinary communication. Reading books on one subject or by one author, re-reading novels or rehearing symphonies fit the conditions listed. However, there must be instances of persons attending a performance, listening to a record, or reading a poem many times purely to repeat their reaction.* If one can accept The Sound of Music as art, (Dewey would, as it fulfills the criteria discussed in pages 14-17) this movie is a case in point. Some people told of returning seven times. By the third viewing, there was surely nothing more to understand. Yet they returned again and again, not only because of their wish-fulfillment reaction to the happy ending, but to see the spectacular mountain photography, or hear the simple but beguiling tunes. They were emotionally absorbing an atmosphere different from their own mundane lives; they did so again and again. Does art no longer communicate to a person once his understanding of it is completed? If not, what can we call a repeated response to a work? Or is art different in this regard from ordinary communication? It seems easier to say that any communication, to communicate, depends not on increased understanding but on response. As long as the response from the receiver is what the

*Granted, much more often, each repeated experience increases understanding, particularly in the case of more complex or significant works.

communicator intended,* has not successful communication occurred?

III. Communication in Art

(a) The Artist

Four qualities have been set out as characteristic of the sender of an ordinary communication: he must have something to say (his subject matter); he must feel some necessity to communicate this subject matter and consciously set about doing so; he must have sufficient skill to be able to say what he intends; finally, he requires not only a medium in which to communicate but a recipient capable of understanding his communication. As well, a communication shares with others. How far is the foregoing statement true of artists, who are often viewed as men quite apart from those who participate in the ordinary exchange of ideas?

Clearly Dewey is against the view of an artist as an especially suitable vehicle for communicating objective truth (or even the prevalent attitudes of his society) as much as he is against the concept which sees the artist as expressing strictly an inner state of mind. He says 'If

*It is admitted that someone could deliberately steel himself from reacting as the communicator intended by feigning a reaction of, say, indifference; this is different from an honest reaction of boredom in that the latter receiver's understanding is either insufficient or too advanced for him to react to that particular level of communication.

an art product is taken to be one of self-expression and the self is regarded as something complete and self-contained in isolation, then of course substance and form fall apart [but] It is also clear that if there be no self-expression the product will of necessity be an instance of a species.³⁶ This is consistent with, even identical to his account of the development of meaning through communication (see p. 32 to 36). The artist then, like the ordinary communicator bases his communication on his personal experience; this experience however is ultimately derived from the real public world. When the artist (or anyone) communicates, his own experience becomes public and part of the store of experience of those who receive his communication. These people in turn communicate with others. Thus meaning develops, understanding increases.

Still there are passages in Dewey's writing that lead one to suppose that the artist is somehow different from the ordinary communicator--someone who communicates without intending to communicate, who has something to say but no special message, who works to create an audience but is necessarily indifferent to its response:

Because objects of art are expressive, they communicate. I do not say that communication to others is the intent of an artist. But it is the consequence of his work. . . . If the artist desires to communicate a special message, he thereby tends to limit the expressiveness of his work to others--whether he wishes to communicate a moral lesson or a sense of his own cleverness. Indifference to the response of the

immediate audience is a trait of all artists that have something new to say. . . . Meantime, the artist works to create an audience to which he does communicate.³⁷

Before considering these enigmatic statements let us note that Dewey admits the last of the four characteristics of a communicator to be true of an artist also. A triadic relationship is necessary: 'a work of art is complete only as it works in the experience of others than the one who created it.'³⁸ The other three characteristics of a communicator will be discussed as they apply to the artist under the following headings: subject, intent to communicate, need to communicate, and skill. Intent and need are treated separately because they focus on separate issues: intent focusses on the artist's relation to the percipient; need focusses on the artist's relation to his subject. Following these sections is a section on the artist as sharer and one on what constitutes a "good" artist.

(i) The Artist's Subject. It is obvious that the ordinary communicator must have a subject to communicate. He does not just make sounds or write words or wave flags. The signals he uses are about a body of material. It is not so obvious that an artist paints, writes or composes about anything. In this century of abstract art and sculpture, subject matter often seems absent, and music and architecture have always lacked what we normally

think of as a subject.

Using Lawren Harris' description (see p. 45), it is possible to conclude that there is always a subject matter for the artist, but that its nature is different from the subject matter used by the ordinary communicator. When Harris speaks of "bring[ing] to life the experience of all life in decrepit houses," he implies more than the physical reality of a house. He means his experience of the character of old houses. In other words, if we can accept Dewey's contention that experience itself is emotive, then the artist's subject matter is not houses but a quality such as shabbiness, frailty, or loneliness which the artist experiences when he perceives the house. This quality may be communicated separately or exist in the work with specific reference to the actual building; when it is communicated separately, we have a form of art like music or abstract art and sculpture, that conveys what is close to Marshall McLuhan's "pure information".

Harris' description is a good basis for understanding Dewey's account of the subject of a work of art. It is supported by Dewey's whole discussion of the development of meaning through communication of experience. But Dewey never calls the quality of an experience the "subject" of a work. When he uses the term subject, he means only the object or event depicted by the artist. This accounts for his claim that the subject is unimportant if not irrelevant

to appreciation of a work of art (see p. 111 and 113, Art As Experience). There does not seem to be any reason, however, that a quality could not be a subject for communication. Therefore let us assume that an artist, like an ordinary communicator, always has a subject to communicate.*

As we have previously seen, no experience is completely personal: the artist's attitude to his subject is shaped by the accumulated experience of humanity (as it affects him) and his own work has the potentiality of becoming part of common experience. It is through the expanding of meaning by communication that Dewey thinks civilization will eventually reject its "uncivil" sects and classes (see p. 336, Art As Experience). Because the unifying force of art as communication is of such importance to Dewey, he worries that 'whatever narrows the boundaries of the material fit to be used in art hems in also the artistic sincerity of the individual artist',³⁹ and 'if the artist desires to communicate a special message he thereby tends to limit the expressiveness of his work to others.'⁴⁰ These seemingly contradictory statements are in fact directed against the same enemy: art that preaches. The former statement is critical of external

*However, note that the use of the term "subject matter" in this paper refers to the event or object that prompts the artist's experience. See Introduction for fuller explanation.

restraints placed on an artist by government, religion or employer. The latter has in mind the artist who himself feels bound to attempt to gain acceptance for a particular moral, political or religious point of view. Either way, Dewey thinks, the meaning of the artist's work is limited. Of course in much of the art we know as great (such as much medieval church art, certain commissioned contemporary works and nearly all music of the time when composers were employed by court or church), the artist is not absolutely free in his choice of subject. The man who paints to fill a certain amount of space, or composes music for a special occasion like a king's pleasure trip on the Thames (Handel's Water Music) is bound to consider the character of his audience, the effect his employer wishes to create in those people, as well as the effect he himself wishes to create. Only for the latter is he completely free in choosing and handling his subject. It is hard to believe that Bach's music, because he was limited to certain suitable subjects according to where he was employed (church or court), is narrower in appeal because of this, although Dewey accuses Shakespeare of the sin of preaching a special message, i.e., the conventional biases in favor of the aristocracy (see p. 190, Art As Experience), and so limiting his "universality". No, art that preaches a doctrine does not necessarily limit itself or fail unless it also fails to convey a

quality of experience. Dewey's own example of Paradise Lost illustrates this. Paradise Lost succeeds because of the qualities or feelings it evokes (see p. 82), not because of its religious message.

(ii) Intent to Communicate (i.e., the attitude of the artist to the percipient). Dewey is very clear in emphasizing that if a communicator does not have the conscious intention of communicating, he himself has not shared in the experience of communication. In Experience and Nature it will be recalled, he uses the example of the cry, "a mere organic overflow" until it is consciously used to tell someone something. He uses the same example in Art As Experience concluding, 'An activity that was "natural"--spontaneous and unintended--is transformed because it is undertaken as a means to a consciously entertained consequence. Such transformation marks every deed of art.'⁴¹ What is this consequence? Obviously from his prior example (the baby's cry) and further discussion, the consequence he entertains is a desired reaction on the part of the observer. Surely this is identical with the conscious intent to communicate characteristic of the ordinary communicator.* What then are we to make of

*We could stretch intent to include subconscious intent because various psychological reasons could be advanced for an artist who hides his work from the public (e.g. he feels his work is no good) just as the same reasons could apply to the letter-writer who tears up his efforts without mailing them.

statements like 'indifference to the response of the immediate audience is a necessary trait of all artists that have something new to say' (see p. 54-55 for full quote) and elsewhere 'It is not necessary that communication should be part of the deliberate intent of an artist although he can never escape the thought of a potential audience.'⁴² (*italics mine*)

What is really being said is that an artist has the intent to communicate but not to a specific audience. He does not and should not try to please a known individual or group. Why not? This is certainly the opposite of ordinary communication, in which the communicator, to succeed, must first of all take into account the character of his receiver and his ability to understand. What is it about art that makes communication possible only on a very impersonal level? Apart from physical considerations like the passage of time and the large numbers of people who must eventually experience such a public communication, the answer seems to lie in the undoubted fact that an artist's audience is relatively ignorant. Whereas the receiver of a message in IBM abbreviations is skilled in interpreting the latest techniques of communication in that medium, the average listener to a work by a modern composer knows only the devices used by composers from the nineteenth century, or earlier. This educational gap means that the two communicants lack one of the essential conditions for communication: a shared language (shared

meanings) based on shared cultural experiences.

It is possible that there will always be resistance to new techniques in art, always a gap between the language understood by the percipient and that used by the artist. However, when the artist deliberately makes some part of the work (its form, its physical material, or its subject) something the audience already understands, they have a clue at least in understanding the communication for they can relate what they do not understand to what they do. This is what is called "starting a pupil's education where he is", an old saw to be sure.

Two points emerge here. One is whether eventual wide acceptance (experiencing) of a work of art is desirable or even possible. Many would disagree with Dewey on this. The other is that whereas Dewey talks of how the artist "works to create an audience to which he does communicate" his tactics apparently must preclude any deliberate attempt to begin within the percipients' own experience because of the necessity of "indifference to their response". It is true that bad art has often accompanied attempts to create art "for the masses" but is this due to the artist's concern for his immediate audience or is it caused by a too-narrow interpretation of the audience's tastes and understanding, advantageous politically or commercially but not culturally?

(iii) Need to Communicate (i.e., the attitude of the artist to his subject). In ordinary communication, the attitude of a person toward a subject is such that he feels a need to send a message about it. Apparently Dewey recognizes this as true of the artist as well. What happens is that 'inner impulse and contact with the environment . . . meet [in experience] and cause a ferment . . . There must be something at stake. . . . A sure thing does not arouse us emotionally.'⁴³ 'To be set on fire by a thought or scene is to be inspired. What is kindled must either burn itself out . . . or must press itself out in material [art].'⁴⁴ The artist must then, feel a need to communicate his experience or his emotion will just die out.

The difference between the need of the ordinary communicator to communicate and that of the artist is that the artist's need is not imposed by the antecedent subject matter itself, but by the fullness and intensity of his experience with the subject. For example, if a signaller sees a sign of danger, like a fire, he is compelled to communicate a warning. If he sees a bowl of flowers (unless it is about to tip over) he has no need to communicate anything. The artist, on the other hand feels a need to communicate that which is most meaningful to him. This may well be the quality evoked by the bowl of flowers. This quality, while admittedly caused by his subject, is not identical to it.

(iv) The Artist's Skill. The ordinary communicator requires skill in using his medium. So does the artist. Both use their skill in order to communicate, whether it be to a hypothetical or real receiver of their communication. The artist, like the sender of an ordinary message, possesses as well as physical deftness, skill in selecting and arranging data in order to realize his intention. The difference lies, as previously pointed out, in the nature of what is to be transmitted. In art, it is the quality of an experience. The artist uses his skills on his medium in such a way that he transmits this quality to the percipient. Thus, in painting or describing a fire, he may describe its location inaccurately or make it appear larger than in reality. This may be done deliberately or inadvertently. But even inadvertently done, his skill is not lacking if he has conveyed to a person reading his description or seeing his picture the quality of the fire. The same could not be said of the fire-spotter who misleads the fire-fighters as to the size or location of the blaze. Thus, the artist may be as exact or vague as he wants. He may present a literal or highly distorted image of reality. His skill is subservient to the quality he wants to convey. However, he must be equally exact and clear in conveying what he intends. A too-delicate brush-stroke, an ill-timed chord, or a clumsy phrase, how he constructs his work, can destroy the effect he wants.

Equally a lack of skill in selecting and arranging what he puts into his work can lead to an unintelligible or misinterpreted communication. In this way he is no different from the ordinary communicator.

All this implies that the artist works coolly, analytically, deliberately. He practises various techniques until he has mastered them physically and can apply them at will to his work. But part of the mystique of the artist is his supposed ability to give birth to ready-formed works, or works that "just grow" from a chance beginning. There is no dearth of statements by poets, painters or musicians to this effect. Dewey's comments on the place of skill in an artist's creative experience are primarily directed towards removing the mystery with which we like to surround artistic activity. Of the artist who thinks he is inspired by some muse or power, Dewey says, 'Excitement [the artist cannot work unless he is aroused emotionally, see p. 66, Art As Experience] stirs up a store of meanings derived from prior experience . . . They do not seem to come from the self, because they issue from a self not consciously known. Hence, by a just myth the inspiration is attributed to a god, or to the muse.'⁴⁵ ' . . . But in fact an emotion is to or from or about something objective, whether in fact or in idea.'⁴⁶ The artist's original choice of subject and his subsequent treatment of this subject (the choice and

arrangement of various technical devices which will convey the desired quality) may not be observable because it is done in the mind, sometimes subconsciously (see p. 74, Art As Experience). For example, Mozart's manuscripts seem to reveal that his works were ready-formed, that he merely copied them onto the paper; Beethoven on the other hand, revised many times everything he wrote. But it is quite probable that Mozart did his selecting and arranging of sounds as he thought about the work. As for the artist (Picasso is one) who claims to start with no idea at all but lets the work create itself, the same could be true. The sculptures Monkey with Young which incorporates a small toy car, The Goat developed from a wicker basket, and Bull's Head from bicycle parts, emerged from the parent articles without any prior intention on Picasso's part to create a monkey or a goat. However, Dewey would say that the toy car, basket and bicycle parts presented possibilities for sculpture because of the meanings they stirred up from the artist's past experience. The resultant works are important because they capture various qualities that Picasso has experienced;* his ability to put the car and basket to use is part of his artistic skill--so is his ability to harness his ideas to his medium. Admittedly

*Monkey with Young bears a strong resemblance to his early painting Acrobat's Family With Ape, and Picasso's life-long preoccupation with the symbol of the bull is well-known.

such an explanation is not refutable but neither is the explanation it seeks to replace.

Another aspect of the common stereotype of the "possessed" artist is treated less directly by Dewey. Whereas it seems normal and desirable for the ordinary communicator to apply himself coolly and dispassionately to his task, we often picture the artist in a frenzy of activity, driven by his inspiration to complete his masterpiece while the creative flame still burns. What is missing in this picture is the skill of self-criticism. It is necessary for the Artist to stand back and look at his work now and then to judge whether he has said what he intended. Part of the artist's technique is to be able to assume the role of percipient and see (or hear) his work as a person unfamiliar with it would. It is all too easy to become so involved in the effect one is trying to create, that one reacts to his original experience, what he hoped to embody in his creation, rather than what is really the substance of his work. Dewey discusses the conflict in an artist between his inner and outer vision (see p. 268, Art As Experience). What he is referring to is the conflict between the artist's own ideas and the outside world, each of which emerges as the most important aspect of his work at various stages. But the same could be said of his actual working process. At one time his inner thoughts (the remembered experience on which his

work is based) are dominant; at another the physical reality of the half-finished work makes demands on his skill. The skill of the artist includes not only his capacity to make his techniques serve his experience but also his ability to make his technique adapt to the physical reality of what he has created from given materials. 'If [the artist's] activities remained . . . merely spontaneous, if free activities were not brought against the resistance offered by actual conditions, no work of art would ever be produced. . . . A creation demands active adaptation to external materials, including a modification of the self so as to utilize and thereby overcome external necessities by incorporating them in an individual vision and expression.'⁴⁷

There is a view of the artist opposite to the one which sees him as 'inspired', and in no way related to a technician of any kind. Among artists and students (particularly in the field of music) one hears discussions of technique only. There is almost never an attempt to put into words what the technique is intended to do. A conductor tells members of the orchestra: 'Second flute, you're flat to the oboe' or 'the clarinet is too loud in bar 54'. A teacher tells his pupil 'No, that note gets three beats not two--COUNT this time!' or 'Keep your fingers curved'.

What has all this to do with art as we have been

discussing it? Nothing on the surface. Are artists really concerned only with perfecting a technical skill? Dewey claims that this is not so. Actually 'they so feel the whole [the complete substance of the work--the quality it conveys] that it is not necessary to dwell upon the end, the whole, in words, and so they are freed to consider how the latter [the whole, presumably] is produced.'⁴⁸ This may be true for the conductor and his orchestra who must inevitably experience the work as a whole, as well as for the composer or painter who as part of their technique visualize the anticipated totality of the work. Only for the young student does art remain purely technical.* Hopefully his conception of artistry enlarges sooner or later.

In summary, though the opposite might at first seem to be true, the qualities possessed by an artist are generally similar to those of the sender of an ordinary communication. He too must have some matter to communicate--but the nature of this matter is different. It consists not of a subject but of his experience of a subject. He forms an intent to communicate, though for Dewey he must have in mind no actual percipient. He must feel a need to communicate his subject, but the need is determined by how deeply he is affected by the experience of a subject, not by any urgency in the material itself.

*The opposite is sometimes true in painting where pupils learn no technique whatsoever, they merely "express themselves".

His skill is used to convey the quality of his experience; his communication no less than the ordinary man's is carefully constructed.

(v) Sharing. Something must be said at this point about the artist as a sharer because Dewey stresses sharing so heavily in ordinary communication.

What Dewey calls the final aspect of communication, sharing as a communion of artist and percipient is more obvious in some forms of art than others. For the composer, author, painter or sculptor there is little of that uniting of human spirits that can exist between an actor or a musician and his audience. While it is quite possible for the reader of a novel to feel when he meets the author that he already knows him, the same is not likely true of the author. Sharing in this sense is lacking in completely creative (as opposed to interpretive) art.

However, we have seen that ultimately sharing for Dewey means participation in shared meanings, participation in an attempt at universal understanding (see p. 50). In this sense artists qualify more fully than others. Let us return to A, B and the flower. In ordinary communication it seems a trivial, if not incorrect, assumption that A (the communicator) imagines himself in the role of B (the recipient of the message) and B, having received the message is now enabled to share A's attitude. As long as B understands what A wants, it seems unimportant whether

he in imagination shares the feeling of desire for the flower or whether A imagines himself as flower-bringer (see p. 32). But if A is an artist, his communication will be specifically an attempt to share his attitude to the flower with whoever perceives his work. If B does not increase his understanding by experiencing in imagination A's attitude (even if he disapproves of it), the artistic communication has failed. And we have already seen that A must periodically put himself in the role of percipient while creating the work in order to succeed (see p. 66). The artist's own understanding is clarified as well by the necessity of organizing his ideas and impressions.

It is this power of the artist to share his own attitudes with others that enables Dewey to claim that

Expression strikes below the barriers that separate human beings from each other. . . . The sense of communion generated by a work of art may take on a definite religious quality . . . Art . . . unites men to all incidents and scenes of life. . . . Art also renders men aware of their union with one another in origin and destiny.⁴⁹

(vi) A 'Good' Artist. It is fairly obvious that the artist, like the ordinary communicator, must correctly understand the experience he wishes to convey, but whereas the ordinary communicator is concerned with factual data, the artist is concerned with a correct assessment of his own experience. He may misinterpret what he has experienced, or he may lack the power to analyse correctly or

completely his own reaction to the subject. Both of these failings could affect the quality of his art. Also, like the ordinary communicator, his own general knowledge is important. From it he can draw implications that may make his communication more effective. To be able to relate a specific experience to a wider area of general experience is of value. 'Knowledge enters deeply and intimately into the production of a work . . . by the meanings funded from prior experiences that are actively incorporated in aesthetic production. [For example] There are artists who have been definitely influenced by the science of their time.'⁵⁰ This is easily seen in the art of poetry where analogy, metaphor and various other devices are used by the artist to make his effect clearer. This is done by alluding to other experiences which have a bearing on the one he describes.

The worth of an artist seems also to depend on how fully the artist experiences. Dewey claims 'It is this degree of completeness of living in the experience of making and perceiving that makes the difference between what is fine and aesthetic in art and what is not.'⁵¹ A difficult point this--how does one measure "the degree of completeness"?

A good artist apparently has a potentially wide appeal. Thus the artist who experiences widely seems to be at an advantage, whereas the one with the "ivory tower" approach is not as able to present an experience

that can be related to the wider common experience of his audience. It is possible that an artist or performer who moves only in a circle of others of his kind, eventually has a somewhat synthetic experience of life: a certain actor observes only other actors--not farmers, carpenters or businessmen--and his expression becomes mannered; a given writer experiences ordinary occupations only indirectly through the work of other writers--and his plays become slick and superficial, an attempt to convey a second-hand experience. In fact many novels and plays are about the world of art or the theatre, probably because this is the only area of life that many writers have experienced intensely.

This point leads to Dewey's claim that a true artist (let us say a good artist) is sincere. His intent is not to impress but to convey his experience. 'In the former [the conventional smirk of greeting] there is a split between what is overtly done and what is intended. The appearance is one of cordiality; the intent is that of gaining favor. . . . When the natural and cultivated blend into one [as in a genuinely gracious act of welcome], acts of social intercourse are works of art.'⁵² The "natural", for the artist, is his actual attitude to his experience, which he hopes to incorporate into his work: joy, anxiety, awe, etc. The "cultivated" is the deliberate effect which his skill creates. In a sincere artist

there is no disparity between the two.

What of the virtuoso, the artist whose intent is avowedly to impress with superior technique? 'Mere perfection in execution can probably be attained better by a machine than by human art. By itself, it is at most technique, and there are great artists who are not in the first ranks as technicians (witness Cezanne) just as there are great performers on the piano [technicians] who are not great aesthetically.'⁵³ Dewey's latter example particularly emphasizes the implication in this quotation--that stress on superior technique tends to neglect the communicative nature of art. The effect on the percipient is that of excitement or awe. Is this an aesthetic reaction? The audience does not share in imagination with the artist any attitude or understanding. If we deny that the composer of a virtuoso concerto, Paganini for example, is an artist or that the performer who plays his work is an artist, then we must deny as an aesthetic experience what is inevitably the most highly applauded work in a given concert. It is easy to grant that many in an audience never do distinguish real art from the artificial, just as many never distinguish between sincere cordiality and good manners. However, even though in ordinary communication virtuosity is desirable only in so far as it increases the intelligibility of the message, in art virtuosity sometimes is the message itself--a trivial message, no doubt,

but still a communication.

The clue is in the word 'exciting' as a reaction of the percipient. Music, we have said, often conveys purely a quality unrelated to any particular experience that may give rise to this quality. It is already "universalized". 'The power of music to merge different individualities to a common surrender . . . testifies to the relative universality of the language of art.'⁵⁴ 'Sound,' Dewey says, 'agitates directly'⁵⁵ and it is for this reason--its refusal to lead the percipient through a particular experience--that it is often considered more universally understood than the other arts. Now, one of the qualities conveyed by a virtuoso performance is excitement--a similar excitement to that conveyed by an acrobatic display. It would have been possible for Paganini to write a violin concerto that was enormously difficult technically, but did not convey excitement. A performer could possibly, given a very sure technique, play the Paganini violin concerto so coolly that the audience would yawn (not that the performer should convey nervousness). But Paganini's work is exciting, its ridiculously simple orchestral accompaniment a deliberate contrast to the feats performed by the violin. The best performers convey this excitement by presenting their own experience of Paganini's intention.

Qualities which make for excellence in an artist then, include a heightened skill, a superior understanding

of his own experience and culture, and a lack of artificiality or pretentiousness. Skill is subservient to the quality to be communicated even when that quality is the excitement of great physical feats.

IV. Communication in Art

(b) The Work of Art

The work of art is the embodiment of the quality that the artist wishes to convey. In creating the work, the artist exercises his skill on certain raw materials. Sometimes these raw materials are textures, like stone, sometimes colors, sometimes various sounds such as those made by the various orchestral instruments. The raw material becomes a medium when in the author's mind it assumes the nature of a means of communication (see p. 287, Art As Experience).

As in much ordinary communication, the artist translates his experience into symbols in order to form his communication. In this case however the symbols are suitable for conveying qualities other than facts. A particular arrangement of flags flown on a ship indicates "Crew have mutinied" but says nothing of the signaller's attitude to the mutiny--the quality of the experience for him. Such symbols must be public symbols; i.e., they must be potentially understandable. Thus just as the quality of the artist's experience derives meaning partly by his own prior personal experience and partly by the common

experience he shares with others, so does his choice of symbols depend on this prior personal experience with them and the common meaning each symbol has gained. Although the symbols an artist uses must not be purely private, new symbols arise from an artist's need to express new modes of experience (see p. 141, Art As Experience). The good artist does not create new technical devices simply to be clever, novel or deliberately obscure. He creates them out of a need inherent in what he wishes to say.

A work of art has a "meaning" though that meaning is of a different nature than that of an ordinary communication. It does not attempt a "correct" description or explanation of an event or object. What it does, Dewey says, is what he later calls 'clarifying and concentrating meanings contained in scattered and weakened ways in the material of other experiences.'⁵⁶

The quality expressed in a work of art is necessarily unique because it is caused by one individual's experience of one particular phenomenon. 'The meaning of an expressive object is individualized. The diagrammatic drawing that suggests grief . . . exhibits the kind of facial "expression" persons in general manifest when suffering grief. The aesthetic portrayal of grief manifests the grief of a particular individual.'⁵⁷ Art can no more convey a "type" of attitude than it can be a 'repetition of anything that previously existed.'⁵⁸ It is

important to distinguish between any abstract art (music for example), which expresses purely a quality, and something (Dewey's example is a line drawing) that depicts a type or kind of experience. Though both may depict only "grief", the former remains a unique communication; the latter does not.

Like the ordinary message, an artistic communication is more effective if it is conveyed in a suitable medium. Most artists have little choice. A composer is not likely to be an expert painter too. However they have more choice than a teletype operator or flag signaler. A composer may choose to write for instrument, voice or orchestra; a painter may use oils or water colors; all sorts of textures offer themselves to the sculptor. Form is also important to a work of art. A telegram has only the form of a telegram; a letter is in letter form. But the user of words can write a short story, a novel or a poem; the communicator in sound can write a symphony, a tone poem or a fugue. The form should also suit the subject (see p. 137, Art As Experience). A not infrequent criticism of a new novel is that its theme would be better treated in short story form. New forms emerge for the same reason that new technical devices do: the need to cope with new modes of experience. Until the percipient is familiar with a new form, he may experience the work as "formless".

One aspect of a work of art that is not apparent in ordinary communication is its unity. A work of art must have a singleness of effect, a dominant mood, feeling or attitude that makes it hang together. We have already referred to Dewey's assertion that a cry or any uncontrolled outpouring of emotion is not art. 'But if the emotion leads one to gather material affiliated to the mood which is aroused, a poem may result. . . . The emotion operates like a magnet drawing to itself appropriate material . . . it works to effect continuity of movement, singleness of effect among variety.'⁵⁹ It might be more correct to say that it is the artist standing outside his emotion in the temporary role of percipient who accepts or rejects various images, colors or sounds according to whether or not they support the quality he wishes to convey. Support for a single effect may be by reinforcement (devices that create a similar effect), diversion (devices that momentarily relax the intensity of the effect so that it is felt more strongly) or contrast (devices that emphasize the effect because they create a completely opposite effect). No material, however, should appear in a work simply because it is interesting in itself or factually true. The balance between all these contributors to the unity of the work creates a sort of ultimate harmony and stability. But, as Dewey points out, 'there is no [art] without resistance, tension and excitement;

otherwise the calm induced is not one of fulfillment.⁶⁰

Such an explanation of balance and harmony in art is more acceptable than Herbert Read's which insists strongly on the Platonic ideal of grace and harmony but ignores the rhythmic pulse of alternate tension and release.

Dewey has no rule-of-thumb for deciding whether what one perceives is art or something else. Presumably, like an ordinary communication, a work is recognized as such when the percipient realizes that someone has created it in order that someone else may perceive it and share in what it conveys. But Dewey does seem to set out two criteria for determining a work of art. (1) He says that anything at all enjoyed for itself rather than as a means to some extrinsic end is art. But here the percipient becomes one with the artist. From a conglomeration of pebbles and driftwood on a beach, a man's vision falls on a particularly pleasing arrangement. (He finds it "pleasing" because of his own prior experience and the commonly accepted meanings of his cultural group.) Like a photographer he blocks out of his range of vision any distracting material such as a nearby scrap of paper. In effect he is enjoying a work of art created by himself. What Dewey has said is only that each one of us is an artist of a sort, who selects and arranges material to fit a personal attitude or mood. (2) Dewey also says that the completeness of the experience of the artist determines

whether an object is art or merely a useful tool. This criterion is difficult to use. What is perceived is an object or structure, having various components. We cannot know from it alone anything about how "completely" the artist experienced its creation. He may have cared deeply about his work but bungled due to lack of skill. Or he may have intended only to create a jug but succeeded in conveying a quality of delicacy or serenity or solidity. All we do know is the effect of perceiving the object. If it conveys a quality of experience then it is art.

An ordinary communication succeeds when it realizes the intent of the sender. In art this must be qualified to "the work has the potentiality of realizing the intent of the sender". Most art is intended for a faceless public. The artist cannot and should not, Dewey says, as the ordinary communicator does, deliberately attempt to be intelligible to a particular percipient. With ordinary communication success cannot possibly occur if the receiver misinterprets due to a fault in the sender's technique. In art, however, it is not impossible, in fact not infrequent, that the artist feels he has fallen short or failed utterly in saying what he originally intended, yet the work communicates well to an audience, even though it has a different message from what was originally intended. Dewey would also have a good work (as opposed to an inferior one, or an attempt at art) free of artifice or pretentiousness, suitable

in form and medium to its substance (content), and unified by a prevailing emotion.

(c) The Percipient. Like the receiver of an ordinary communication, the percipient must understand the symbols used in order that communication may occur, but he himself need not know how to use them. He requires neither the physical skill required in sculpting, painting or the performing arts nor the mental skill necessary in the artist for selecting and arranging his symbols of communication. It is more usual for the percipient of a work of art to partially understand the work than to fully understand it. This is partly due to the complexity of the message conveyed in a work of art compared to an ordinary communication, and partly due to the educational gap between the artist's understanding and that of his public (see p. 60).

As for native talents like pitch or color discrimination, sense of rhythm, and so on (which incidentally are not "just there" but can be developed as a skill through practice), they seem less important to the percipient than the artist, though he must not entirely lack the particular abilities necessary to enjoy various types of art. The greater his abilities the more critical he becomes. he appreciates subtleties and degrees of excellence more and is less tolerant of the faulty and mediocre. In a sense his experience of the quality is heightened--more

intense, in a sense lessened as his sensitivity to small details interferes with his capacity to experience the whole.

A reaction is demanded of the percipient of a work of art; presumably this is because it is contrived in such a way that it conveys a quality. A person understanding the language used (color, sound, words) must necessarily experience the work, unless he has some psychological quirk which makes him deliberately ignore it. Even if he does not realize that what he perceives is a communication from someone, he must still react. On the other hand, in ordinary communication, unless a person realizes that what he sees is an attempt at communication he need not react. For example, bent twigs do not require a reaction from one who sees them unless he realizes they communicate the direction a traveller has taken. However if certain pieces of wood grouped together create a particular quality they demand a reaction from the percipient whether he knows that someone took great care to arrange them that way just to convey an effect or whether he thinks they just happened to lie that way (this providing of course he knows the language of line, balance and so on in this medium).

The reaction demanded of the percipient is that of experiencing the work aesthetically. This means that his enjoyment of the work as a means to social status or as a

release from the cares of the day or as a rare and precious object does not count. He must experience it for the quality it conveys and nothing more. Such experiencing requires that he be receptive to the experience, and 'receptivity is not passivity, [but] a series of responsive acts . . . Otherwise there is not perception but recognition.'⁶¹ 'The beholder,' Dewey says, 'must create his own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent.'⁶² He must, like the artist select, clarify, and interpret according to his own past experience.

The reaction of a percipient to a work is primarily emotional (see p. 53, Art As Experience), but it is not emotional in the same way that a reaction to the communication of bad news is emotional. Sometimes the emotion of the percipient is called "imagined emotion". If this means that what he experiences is not a real emotion but an illusion of an emotion then Dewey would disagree. However it is true that imagination plays a part in the emotion effected in the percipient; particularly in works based on a particular subject such as a novel or a realistic painting, the percipient must imagine the real object or event upon which the work is based from the symbols (words, colors or lines) given to him.* Dewey's only explanation

*In listening to music or viewing abstract art, no such imagining is necessary. Perhaps this is why Dewey says 'sound agitates directly' (see p. 237, Art As Experience).

of the difference between an emotion caused by a work of art and ordinary emotion is that the former consists of 'natural emotions that have been transformed.'⁶³ A fuller explanation can be drawn from his classification of experience into direct and indirect.

Suppose A wires B of the death of B's friend. B reads the telegram; his reaction is sorrow. This is an indirect experience, i.e. he was not present at the actual death. His reaction however is not caused by the letter but by the physical reality of the removal of someone from his world. This is as direct an experience as his experience of the removal of some object from his house; his emotional response, though more profound is directly caused.

On the other hand, suppose L writes a poem after the death of his friend. It conveys the dominant quality of his experience, in this case sorrow. M reads the poem; his reaction (if the quality has been well presented) will be sorrow. This too is an indirect experience. But unless he knows L's friend, which is unlikely, M's reaction is caused by the work of art, not by the death. His emotion is indirectly caused. Even if he makes a strong connection between the work and an actual experience of his own, it is to the memory of his own experience that he reacts. This too is an indirect experience.

The result of an aesthetic experience may be action.

If his emotion is intense, the percipient may feel a need to spend it by discussing the experience with friends who have experienced the same work of art, or by dancing or by crying or by rioting. (It is not out of perversity that performance of certain kinds of music is banned during times of crisis.) This is akin to the artist's action (see p. 65, Art As Experience) after a profound experience. This action is not part of the aesthetic experience, however, whereas the artist's action is the artistic experience (the act of creating art).

Obviously the emotion of the percipient must be occasioned by the work. Enjoyment because the work is rare and valuable or irritation because his wife dragged him out, are not valid aesthetic emotions. But a person overwhelmed by emotion is prevented from experiencing aesthetically, just as a person completely possessed by an emotion cannot create a work of art. In such a case 'there is no relationship felt to the qualities of the activity [perception of the work] that has generated the passion. Consequently, the material of the experience lacks elements of balance and proportion.'⁶⁴ The person overwhelmed by emotion is similar to the person who uses the object of art as a springboard for old memories or fanciful imaginings. He has only minimal contact with the work. 'It is not enough that [images and emotions] should be occasioned by the object: in order to be an experience

of the object they must be saturated with its qualities.⁶⁵ Music presents a special problem for the percipient. It is difficult to concentrate on joy when listening to the last movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, without feeling joy about something, or to experience bitterness and contempt in Mahler's Second (third movement) without wandering off into personal experiences of these qualities or the historical and cultural realities in which the composer lived. Dewey does not want the percipient to completely shut out his personal experiences or other knowledge he may have from prior indirect experience. It is only by relating his new aesthetic experience to other experience that his understanding is broadened or deepened. What he does insist upon is a balancing and fusing of any background the percipient has.

The opposite of the percipient overwhelmed by emotion is the one who perceives only technique. If he experiences any sort of emotion it is that of admiration or scorn. This is certainly occasioned by the work, but not by the quality the work conveys. It might be said that his experience of the work is no more aesthetic than that of the day-dreamer. However, knowledge of technique or rules is as important as historical knowledge, personal experience or any other background that a person may bring with him when he experiences aesthetically. 'To know what to look for and how to see it is an affair of readiness on

the part of motor equipment. . . . The one who knows something about the relation of the movements of the pianoplayer to the production of music from the piano will hear something the mere layman does not perceive,' says Dewey. But one of the faults of the 'blase critic' is that 'while he skillfully apprehends how things are done, he does not care for what is expressed.'⁶⁶ He has lost contact with the meaning of the communication. To perceive in the pianist only his degree of virtuosity or whether he plays correctly (according to the rules) is to have missed the point of the performance; it is the contribution his technique and obedience (or flouting) of the rules make to the unified effect he is trying to communicate that is important.

The percipient is not likely to share anything with others except under certain conditions. The aesthetic experience is pretty much a private thing. In the performing arts it is possible for the audience and performer to "work on each other" in such a way that the performance is heightened in intensity or becomes cold and lifeless (see pp. 46-47). Only rarely do percipients share with each other in their experience of art--certainly not at plays, or in art galleries. An exception seems to be the recent phenomenon of the rock festival or concert where not only is there a felt unity among the percipients but their participation (hand-clapping, singing choruses) is often necessary to complete the particular work being performed.

But if the percipient does not share with others, he does share in the common experience whereby the meanings of his culture are deepened, enhanced and related to other cultures--present and past. 'When the art of another culture enters into attitudes that determine our experience genuine continuity is effected. Our own experience . . . takes unto itself . . . elements that expand its significance.'⁶⁷

Therefore the percipient is an active learner--more so than the artist. The artist need consider only his own experience. The percipient unites his own with that of another. However it is doubtful that most percipients have the conscious intent of sharing in the meanings of their culture. We are back again to the problem of the person who still enjoys a work of art even after he has learned as much as he can from it. Further explanation can now be added to the one offered on pp. 52-53. We have said that as long as the percipient responds to the work, communication occurs. But why does he seek this stimulus to his emotions? Is there perhaps a sort of balance scale in the human body that makes him seek excitement when he is tranquil for a time, and seek tranquility after a period of excitement? Dewey states 'Only when an organism shares in the ordered relations of its environment does it secure the stability essential to living. And when the participation comes after a phase of disruption and conflict, it bears within itself the germs of a consummation akin to the

esthetic,'⁶⁸ and 'There are two sorts of possible worlds in which esthetic experience would not occur. In a world of mere flux . . . [and] where everything is already complete, there is no fulfillment.'⁶⁹ If it is possible that we instinctively seek a balance of tension and harmony, it is also possible that we seek unity and 'the esthetic object operates . . . to pull together energies that have been separately occupied in dealing with many different things.'⁷⁰ In this sense we are always learning from a work of art because the background of our own experiences with which the work unites is constantly changing. Our pleasure then in works of art has something to do with our desire to simulate a balance of tension and release that we cannot always find in real life.

PART C: GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

Dewey's conceptions of experience and communication are themselves aspects of education, for Dewey strongly implies that experience is learning (see pp. 7-8), and that communication of experience by a given person is teaching (see p. 11). Since art is considered by Dewey to be the most effective means of communicating experience, i.e. of educating (see p. 12), Dewey's statements on art as communication must be strongly indicative of what he considers to be the nature of the acts of teaching and learning. Like Herbert Read, Dewey undoubtedly wants all educational experience to approach artistic and aesthetic experience. However, what he says about artistic communication applies most obviously to the teaching of such subjects as music, "art", drama, or English literature. Even concentrating on these, it seems quite possible for different people to draw quite different implications merely by changing emphasis. Still there do seem to be some fairly clear general implications for the teaching of the arts that follow directly from Dewey's conception of art as a means of communicating experience.

I. Experience

Dewey insists that primary and secondary experience

cannot be separated completely, but is equally clear that primary experience is a pre-requisite for reflective activity (see p. 12). This suggests that in the teaching of music, art, drama, and literature much opportunity will be given for the students to experience with their senses and emotions. Thus they will spend considerable time "doing" art: playing music, painting pictures, acting plays, writing poems; they will attend concerts, plays and art displays; they will also experience directly various aspects of their environment which will stir them visually, aurally and emotionally such as factories, "inner city" conditions, the coming of spring, political meetings and so on. Then opportunity for reflection on such sensory experience will be provided. Sometimes this may be through class discussion* which enables students to share and analyse their own personal experience of the subject, providing greater learning than when such communication does not occur (see p. 10 and p. 35). Reflection on primary experience may also be through artistic activity; Dewey emphasizes that such communication helps to clarify one's experience to oneself (see p. 38 footnote). The usefulness of such secondary experience becomes apparent when the knowledge gained serves as a background for a new primary experience (see Dewey's example of the observed eclipse in Experience and Nature, p. 14, where such an event viewed after theorizing takes on new significance).

*For an example, see Manuel Barkan's Through Art to Creativity, p. 297.

Put more abstractly, Dewey's concept of experience indicates a spirally moving learning process (see p. 50). A direct (a visit to a factory) or indirect (a concert) primary experience along with secondary, reflective experience (A), causes the student to assimilate certain knowledge. This knowledge when brought to a new primary experience (B), causes the new experience to be fuller--on a higher level--even in the primary aspect than it would have been without such background. Subsequent (or even simultaneous--see p. 9) reflection will unite both previous (A) and present (B) primary experiences and this body of knowledge will then enhance future primary experience (C). In this way, the student's base of knowledge is constantly strengthened.

In this regard, artistic activity mainly provides secondary experience for students. While the senses do experience the feel of clay, the brilliance of color, the timbre of sound, the student in attempting to convey a quality of experience analyses, selects, and in general reflects on some previously purely sensory-emotional experience (see pp. 66-67). Such reflection affects the quality not only of the subsequent primary experiences but also of his later artistic communication. In aesthetic experience on the other hand, primary and secondary experience are more evenly divided; more learning probably takes place here (see p. 49) than through the more reflective

artistic experience because the student is on the receiving end of communication.

II. Communication

To see art as Dewey does, i.e. as the most effective means of communicating the combined experience of a society (see p. 14) indicates that subjects such as art, music, and drama will be strongly emphasized in the curriculum. Moreover, these subjects will be considered as languages in the same way that the printed word is; Dewey indicates (see p. 30) that in order for communication to occur, the participants must share a common language. Thus, the language of color, line, and texture for example will be learned as surely as that of words, phrases and sentences. In fact such languages as the former, used by the various arts to convey their special meanings, become especially important since speech is used also in ordinary and technical communication, and its use for artistic communication may be slighted in education. 'Communication through speech, oral and written, is the familiar and constant feature of social life . . . events that are familiar and customary are those that we are least likely to reflect upon; we take them for granted.'⁷¹ In short, as children learn reading and writing--as means of communicating and of understanding the communication of others, so children will approach the techniques of the various arts--not as ends in themselves*,

*Dewey has indicated that he is opposed to the opposite approach, i.e. teaching art as "self-expression" or "play" (see pp. 277-281, Art As Experience).

but as means of communicating through art and understanding this kind of communication from others.

To treat the arts as languages that can be learned is to decrease the educational gap between artist and percipient (see p. 60). What then of the danger of over-familiarity? Will art as a means of communication be reduced in value because it is "taken for granted" (see quotation 71)? Dewey is certainly not an adherent of any theory which insists that art must remain a rarity amongst everyday activities or the privilege of the few (see pp. 8-10 Art As Experience). He would no doubt argue that the language of art, because of its very nature, will not allow us to take its messages for granted. For one thing, each work of art is necessarily unique because the artist brings to his subject, which is public, his own private store of past experiences (see pp. 76-77). Also, the percipient brings to a work his own past experience. Since his background of past experience is different each time he views a work, his aesthetic experience is changed each time he perceives it. Thus, however familiar students become with the language of a given medium of art, they will always be able to learn (to experience something new*, see p. 89).

It will be noted that the foregoing educational

*However it is probably true that perceiving the same work day after day jades one's appreciation.

implications are not only very general but also somewhat idealistic. Everyone who has taught knows that such statements have little to do with what is actually accomplished in a classroom. If such ideals are achieved the reason lies not so much in the teacher's knowledge or belief that art is communication but in various character traits of the teacher, students, and the community. It is all very well to accept Dewey's contention that art is a particularly suitable medium for communicating the meanings and values of various cultures, leading ultimately to universal understanding and thus, presumably, true brotherhood of man; but it has yet to be proven that two people of unfriendly races who share a love for the same paintings or music are any less antipathetic to each other than those who do not.

Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the power of communication and particularly its artistic form, and it seems constructive to view art as a very important means of communicating one sort of meaning, at least. The teacher who, all other things being equal, bases his task on the firm conviction that he is equipping his students to participate in the communication of the qualities of experience of their culture and others, and that this participation is important, if not vital to their own humanness, cannot help but succeed in a deeper sense than those with a more facile approach.

FOOTNOTES

¹John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1958), p. 334

²Ibid., p. 335.

³John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1958), p. 8.

⁴Ibid., p. 11.

⁵John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1921), pp. 272-3.

⁶Ibid., pp. 274-5.

⁷Ibid., p. 163.

⁸Ibid., pp. 172-173.

⁹Ibid., pp. 272-3.

¹⁰Dewey, A as E, p. 336.

¹¹Ibid., p. 336.

¹²Ibid., p. 67.

¹³Ibid., p. 286.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 106.

¹⁸Thorndike Barnhart Concise Dictionary, p. 106.

¹⁹Dewey, E & N, p. 183.

²⁰Ibid., p. 204.

²¹Ibid., pp. 203-4.

²²Ibid., p. 178.

²³Ibid., p. 175.

²⁴Ibid., p. 177.

²⁵Ibid., p. 179.

²⁶Ibid., p. 171.

²⁷Ibid., p. 167.

²⁸Ibid., p. 173.

²⁹Ibid., p. 175.

³⁰Ibid., p. 170.

³¹Dewey, D & E, p. 6.

³²Dewey, E & N, p. 180.

³³Bess Harris and R.G.P. Colgrove (eds.), Lawren Harris (Toronto: The MacMillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1969), pp. 24-26.

³⁴Dewey, E & N, p. 188.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 204-5.

³⁶Dewey, A as E, p. 107.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 104-5.

³⁸Ibid., p. 106.

³⁹Ibid., p. 190.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 104.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 62.

⁴²Ibid., p. 270.

⁴³Ibid., p. 66.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 65.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 65-66.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 67.

- ⁴⁷Ibid., p. 282.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., p. 200.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., p. 270.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., p. 289.
- ⁵¹Ibid., p. 26.
- ⁵²Ibid., p. 63.
- ⁵³Ibid., p. 47.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., p. 335.
- ⁵⁵Ibid., p. 237.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., p. 84.
- ⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 90-91.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., p. 288.
- ⁵⁹Ibid., p. 69.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., p. 160.
- ⁶¹Ibid., p. 52.
- ⁶²Ibid., p. 54.
- ⁶³Ibid., p. 77.
- ⁶⁴Ibid., p. 49.
- ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 276.
- ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 98.
- ⁶⁷Ibid., p. 336.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., p. 15.
- ⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 16-17.
- ⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 176-7.
- ⁷¹Ibid., p. 334.

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